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Why does pressure to hold free and fair elections by the opposition prevent some 
competitive autocrats from stealing elections but not others? My paper illustrates how 
extent of power-sharing in the autocratic party determines the decision to either refrain 
from ballot-rigging or try to cling to power through electoral fraud when the opposition can 
credibly threaten a massive civil disobedience against tainted elections. I argue that diffused 
power in the ruling party/high power-sharing amongst party elites makes the autocrat 
refrain from electoral rigging, even at the risk of losing, when there is a high threat that the 
opposition will lead a large-scale civil disobedience to challenge tainted election results. 
While in the case of concentrated power in the ruling party/low power-sharing amongst 
party elites the autocrat will rig elections to cling to power even when there is a high threat 
of civil disobedience following suit. I analyze the contrasting cases of the Socialist Party of 










During the Third Wave of Democratization, electoral autocrats responded in different ways 
to domestic pressure for free and fair elections.  In 1994 the revolutionary Zapatista army, 
which had initiated a leftist armed rebellion in many parts of Mexico, demanded free and 
fair elections from the authoritarian government. This challenge emboldened 
institutionalized civil society and led to Mexico’s opposition parties jointly signing a pact for 
pushing electoral reforms. President Ernesto Zedillo of the dominant Institutional Republic 
Party (PRI), conceded by creating an independent Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) before 
presidential elections of 1994. The IFE had previously been under government’s control and 
thus had often been accused of manipulating of votes to guarantee the PRI’s electoral 
victory by opposition groups. This breakthrough in electoral reform was to symbolize the 
government’s willingness to hold clean elections by detaching itself from control of the 
electoral process. 
Conversely, the demand for free and fair elections made by the united opposition in Serbia 
was not heeded by President Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). The call for clean 
elections was vociferously put forward at a large protest rally attended by nearly 200,000 
citizens in the capital city of Belgrade five months before the 2000 presidential elections.1 
However, the government still engaged in widespread electoral which instigated opposition 
parties and thousands of their supporters to come out on the streets to challenge election 
results. Subsequently this triggered the defection of the armed forces from the 
                                                          
1
 See  Goati 2000, 45-59 
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authoritarian government and fresh elections which brought the opposition candidate 
Vojislav Koštunica to power. 
Why does pressure to hold free and fair elections by the opposition prevent some 
competitive autocrats from stealing elections2 but not others?  
Unlike democratic elections, those held in authoritarian regimes are typically neither free 
nor fair. Schedler highlights the “menu of manipulation” that autocrats avail to control 
elections. Dictators determine rules of the electoral game through restrictions on civil and 
political liberties and electoral laws which give incumbents an unfair advantage in the 
electoral arena. And through vote-buying, intimidation of political opponents and voters 
and manipulation of the vote-count, autocrats control the game of elections itself. 3   
Since autocrats control elections in myriad ways to ensure that they emerge victorious at 
the polls, opposition parties are meant to lose elections.4 However, elections in competitive 
authoritarian regimes are not clear games of contestation which always yield predictable 
results. While autocrats control the rules of the electoral game, the opposition parties 
control the legitimacy of elections.5 Unlike hegemonic authoritarian regimes, where 
opposition only exists at the margins of the political system and elections are simply a 
procedural activity (like in Singapore, Uzbekistan) the opposition in competitive autocracies 
(for instance, Mexico during the 1990s, Egypt since the 1990s) has the capacity to defeat the 
                                                          
2
 Stealing refers to electoral fraud or annulment of election by the incumbent regime to maintain its control. 
3
 Schedler 2002a, 36-50 and 2002b, 105-108; Birch 2009, 395-410; Case 2009, 95-112 
4
 See section on opposition parties in Schedler 2009, 381-394 
5
 See Schedler 2002b, 113. Schedler conceives of democratization through elections should as a nested game – 
at the meta-game level autocrats controls the electoral rules, while major choices for opposition actors are at 
the game level of electoral competition.   
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authoritarian incumbents. This makes electoral cheating even more necessary for autocrats 
to ensure their victory.6 
Yet paradoxically so, electoral rigging can potentially be a risky decision when a relatively 
strong opposition can threaten to challenge election results. For example, Fabrice Lehoucq 
and Ivan Molina in their detailed study on electoral fraud in Costa Rica find out that as inter-
party competition rose, paradoxically parties faced more incentives to “denounce and 
commit fraud”.7 Similarly Dominguez and McCann in their study of electoral fraud under the 
PRI in Mexico argue that accusations against fraud were more common in the more 
competitive urban areas.8 Thompson and Kuntz argue that stolen elections can be a focal 
point for channelling public dissent because it creates an “imagined community” of robbed 
voters.9 And Joshua Tucker argues that even though ordinary citizens might not challenge 
the regime due to collective action problems in everyday life, electoral fraud radically alters 
the individual’s calculus about partaking in protests to dislodge an unpopular regime.10  
This thesis explains why certain competitive autocrats take the risky decision of electoral 
rigging while others do not, when faced with similar pressure from the opposition to hold 
free and fair elections. Due to the remarkable durability of electoral autocracies, there has 
been considerable scholarly interest in studying the role of electoral fraud in the preserving 
the dominance of autocratic parties.11 
                                                          
6
 See Levitsky and Way, 2000 on differences between authoritarian regimes which hold elections. 
7
 Lehoucq and Molina cited in Schedler 2002b, 116. 
8
 Domınguez and McCann 1996, 269 
9
 Thompson and Kuntz 2004,  162 
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 Tucker 2007, 540-542 
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See Schedler and Birch, 2009; Also see Magaloni 2006, Ch. 8 and 2010, 751–765 
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My argument illustrates how diffusion/concentration of decision-making power (or high/low 
power-sharing) in the ruling party affects the autocrat’s choice to either refrain from ballot-
rigging or steal elections when there is a threat that tainted elections will cause mass 
protests. Variation in power-sharing is the independent variable explaining why the threat 
of mass revolt by the opposition will make some autocrats refrain from ballot rigging but not 
others.  
Autocratic parties with diffused power or high power-sharing amongst elites are more likely 
to respond to the credible threat of post-election challenges by abstaining from electoral 
fraud. For party elites losing elections peacefully without electoral manipulation actually has 
a higher payoff than that for inciting mass protests through ballot-rigging which can 
instigate the defection of the armed forces and in turn fresh elections. In this scenario, the 
party stands to lose legitimacy which can cause the defection of its voters and party 
members thereby threatening its disintegration and demise of political careers of party 
members. Whereas losing elections still allows the party to have some access to state 
resources and control over policy-making due to some legislative representation. Thus by 
avoiding tampering with votes, such a ruling party will serve the collective interest of party 
elites i.e. maintaining party legitimacy and cohesiveness. 
On the contrary, parties with concentration of power or low power-sharing amongst elites 
are less likely to be receptive to the likelihood of a mass challenge by the opposition in the 
aftermath of electoral cheating. Due to the centralized nature of decision-making in the 
party, the dictator cannot be stopped from rigging elections in spite of a high probability of 
mass conflict.  This is because for the dictator and his loyalists the payoffs for losing “clean” 
elections are the same as that for inciting mass conflict through electoral fraud which leads 
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to the defection of the armed forces and fresh elections. Both result in the worst-case 
scenario of the loss of the highest political office and legal impunity for the top leader.  
Therefore the party with low power-sharing is more likely to take the risk of rigging 
elections so that the top leader can cling to power, even if there is formidable pressure from 
the opposition to hold free and fair elections.  
My study endeavours to be an important addition to the burgeoning literature on electoral 
authoritarianism and democratization. Regular elections have played an important role in 
durability of authoritarian regimes because they are an important institutional mechanism 
through which members of society can become part of or sustain membership in the ruling 
authoritarian coalition and thus have access to perks, rents and other state resources.12  
However elections in competitive autocracies are not an easy win for incumbents; they are 
rather strategic affairs during which incumbents’ decisions have to carefully anticipate the 
opposition’s response to techniques of electoral manipulation. A fascinating string of 
“coloured revolutions” in Serbia (2000), Ukraine (2002), Georgia (2003) and Kyrgyzstan 
(2004) in the new millennium has shown how ordinary citizens have the capacity to 
challenge and bring down authoritarian governments which blatantly manipulated elections. 
Yet at the same time other electoral autocrats in Mexico (1994), Senegal (2000) and Kenya 
(2002) behaved in a more prudent manner when faced with a strong opposition demanding 
free and fair elections. 
There is no convincing theoretical explanation of why some competitive autocrats risked 
mass conflict in their drive to cling to power through extensive ballot-rigging while others 
                                                          
12
 See Lisa Blaydes, 2006 and Beatriz Magaloni 2008, 195-218  for an analysis on politics of rent distribution in 
authoritarian regimes 
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preferred losing clean elections. This paper will explain what conditions will make certain 
electoral autocrats give up power to opposition forces to allow “liberalizing electoral 
outcomes”13 or an “electoral alternations”14 but not others.  
Methodology and case selection 
My method consists of analyzing small-n case studies of elections under competitive 
autocracies. My case selection seeks variation on my independent and dependent variables. 
Since I am aiming to explain why autocratic elites faced with the same social conditions 
behave in different ways, I use the “congruence method” of case study. In the congruence 
method, a theory providing deductive hypotheses or empirical generalizations for how 
variation in the independent variable leads to the variation of the dependent variable is 
empirically tested without the need to trace the exact process.15 This method is suitable for 
my research because dynamics of elite decision-making – like motivations of leaders, intra-
elite bargaining - is often veiled from public scrutiny and the exact causal process linking the 
independent to the dependent variable cannot be unambiguously traced.  Therefore using a 
decision-making tree in my theoretical framework, I show why rational leaders strategically 
choose from alternative courses of action and make some predictive deductions. I use my 
cases to then test these deductions which explain the variation in rational behaviour of 
elites constrained by similar environment.  
As I have explained above my theory is only applicable to competitive autocracies where 
opposition is an important force in politics. Hegemonic autocracies –where opposition 
simply exists at the margins are not the focal point of my research.  I use the following 
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 Howard and Roessler 2006, 443-455 
14
 Wahman 2010 
15
 George and Bennett 2005, Ch 9 
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measurements to differentiate between competitive and hegemonic party regimes: a) the 
ruling party does not have a supermajority in the parliament b) there is a major mainstream 
opposition party or an opposition coalition.  
While I am only focussing on two main case-studies, my theory can be applied to strategic 
behaviour of most competitive autocrats in the electoral arena. Autocrats which gave up 
power through electoral turnovers during the Third Wave of Democracy, displayed 
fascinating divergence in strategic behaviour during elections. Faced by a growing 
opposition, many autocratic parties minimized electoral cheating by undertaking electoral 
reforms to make polls more free and fair. The PRI in Mexico and the Socialist Party (SP) in 
Senegal during the 1990s are two clear examples. Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan, also 
undertake electoral reforms to increase electoral competition and decrease electoral 
corruption (like vote-buying) during the 1990s. Yet autocrats in Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia blatantly rigged elections in spite of third-party electoral administration and high 
mobilization of the opposition.16 My theory can be applied to explain discrepancy in 
autocratic behaviour across these different cases. 
My two main case studies of elections under the PRI in Mexico (1994-2000) and under 
Socialist Party of Serbia in Serbia (2000) seek variation on the independent variable and 
dependent variable.  Through analyses of these cases, I aim to infer how differences in 
autocratic power structures causally relate to differences in rational decision-making in the 
electoral arena. In my cases I also try to highlight how change in the strength of the 
opposition altered strategic decision-making for some autocrats but not others to confirm 
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 See McFail 2005, 5-19 for a study of transitions in Post-communist Europe. 
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the impact of my independent variable on the decision to commit or refrain from electoral 
fraud.   
I have three significant reasons for choosing my main case-studies. Firstly, since I conceive 
of my independent variable in dichotomous terms – concentration as opposed to diffusion 
of power in the ruling party – these clearly contrasting cases are ideal for allowing highest 
variation on the independent variable.   The PRI in Mexico - the longest ruling autocrat of 
the twentieth century –probably had the most diffused structure of intra-party power-
sharing in the world. Every five years there was rotation of the Presidency. This 
institutionalized setup of rank-and-file promotion to the highest office was supposed to 
thwart concentration of power; to prevent personalistic interests taking precedence over 
party interests and also to allow new incumbents to effectively deal with new challenges in 
the changing environment.  The case of the SPS in Serbia is an example of an extreme 
concentration of power in the office of the presidency. During the 1990s Milosevic held the 
sole prerogative to hire fire and promote party personnel in the SPS without adequate 
accountability. Serbia is also a case where the first coloured revolution happened in Eastern 
Europe. This effectively ensures that the mass protests which resulted after rigging of 
elections, was not caused by a “demonstration effect” due to earlier precedents in 
neighbouring countries.  
These two cases can be classified as “least likely” cases thus making them highly relevant for 
theory-testing.17 As one military regime had fallen one after another in major countries of 
South America in the 1980s, the authoritarian party-led regime in Mexico had shown no 
signs of weakening. Unlike regime change experienced in many countries during the three 
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 Levy 2002, 432-455 
W a q a r  | 14 
 
waves of democratization, Mexico’s democratization was “elusive” because it did not 
register a critical juncture which can be identified as a categorical break from the 
authoritarian legacy of the past.18 In many ways, the amazing longevity and strong 
institutional roots of hegemonic-party rule had made democratization seem like a remote 
possibility in Mexico. Yet even seventy years of rule, the PRI surprisingly created an 
independent body for monitoring elections and then subsequently peacefully accepted 
defeat through clean elections. 
While in Serbia, Milosevic’s audacity to rig elections and deny the opposition its legitimate 
electoral victory appears most surprisingly in the context of the domestic and international 
environment. There was strong domestic pressure for clean elections, which can be 
measured in terms of opposition-led mass demonstrations for holding free and fair polls. 
Milosevic’s unpopularity was on an all-time high. At the same time, due to Milosevic’s 
conspicuous involvement in instigating the ethnic genocides in Bosnia and Kosovo, the 
international community was keen to witness the electoral ouster of the repressive Serbian 
President. The EU had given extensive financial assistance to the independent media, civic 
groups and opposition parties of Serbia and EU observers were present to monitor the 
electoral process. Such high mobilization of the populace were indicators of the very strong 
possibility that the regime will not risk electoral fraud and allow an electoral turnover but 
still Milosevic refused to loosen his grip over power.  
 
 
                                                          
18
 See Whitehead 1995, 246—269 regarding the gradual demise of the dominant party system in Mexico.  
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Roadmap 
In the following section of this thesis, I will be discussing alternative explanations for my 
research question and their respective weaknesses. I will then introduce my own theoretical 
framework comprising my hypothesis, conceptualization and measurements in a separate 
section. In the fourth section of this thesis, I will test my theory by analyzing my case-studies. 
Lastly, I will conclude by summarizing the findings of my study and analyze its implications 
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Alternative Explanations 
Alternative Explanation 1: The threat of mass conflict ex ante determines whether 
competitive autocrats choose to rig elections or not.  
Magaloni argues that threat of a mass conflict can strategically deter autocrats from rigging 
elections. She refers to mass conflict as a situation of a large-scale civil disobedience and this 
can refer to rallies, demonstrations, protests and even include armed challenges against the 
regime.19  According to Magaloni, rigged elections can lead to a situation of a mass conflict if 
a strong opposition challenges election results through massive civil disobedience. This can 
instigate the intervention of the armed forces, which can either defect to the side of the 
opposition by calling for fresh elections or support the regime and shoot on the opposition. 
Therefore the autocrat’s decision to rig elections when the strong opposition has the 
potential to contest tainted electoral results heightens the risk of military intervention with 
the consequent possibility of military defection. Thus autocrats are likely to act in a cautious 
way when the threat of mass conflict is credible.20  
Magaloni and Howard and Roessler argue that opposition coordination prior to elections is a 
credible indicator of a mass conflict if the autocrat seriously tampers electoral results.21  
Magaloni argues that opposition unity before elections – measured as opposition groups 
forming electoral coalitions between elections or collectively endorsing the presidential 
candidate– can prevent autocrats from engaging in electoral fraud because it makes the 
                                                          
19
 The terms mass conflict/mass challenge/large-scale civil disobedience have been used interchangeably 
throughout the paper.  
20
 Magaloni 2010, 751–765 
21
 Ibid; Howard & Roessler, 2006 
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threat of mass conflict credible ex ante. Magaloni asserts that in presidential systems like 
Senegal and Kenya in 2000 and 2002, opposition coalitions supporting a common 
presidential candidate formed ex ante  threatened a mass conflict in case of major electoral 
fraud by the authoritarian incumbents.22 
Howard and Roessler argue that formation of a collective opposition front can prevent 
autocrats from using “divide and rule” strategy to play opposition groups against one to 
survive in power. Therefore, it becomes difficult for the autocrat to collude with certain 
opposition groups to engage in abuse of the electoral process. Also a strong collective 
opposition increases the perceived costs of repression and manipulation of elections. If the 
security services realize that the opposition can credibly oust the dictator, the possibility of 
ex post castigation can prevent these institutions from aiding the incumbent.23 Through 
statistical analysis, Howard and Roessler show that emergence of opposition coalitions 
before elections greatly increase the chance of defeat of the incumbent, leading to a 
liberalizing electoral outcome (LEO). 24 Figure 1 depicts this mechanism, which prevents 
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 Magaloni, 759  
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 Howard and Roessler, 371 
24
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While this explanation makes logical sense, it does not elucidate variation in empirical cases.  
Keeping the condition of a credible opposition revolt constant in all cases, some autocrats 
were willing to hold clean elections others were not. However due to the variation in 
actions of different autocrats in the electoral arena in response to the threat of mass 
conflict, it is clearly not the independent variable. 
For example, the actions of the PRI in Mexico reflected a high commitment to institutional 
procedures implying that some autocrats will actually refrain from manipulation of elections 
when faced with a rising opposition, even if it leads to their electoral ouster. Magaloni 
stresses that the PRI in Mexico was willing to give independence to the IFE in 1994 to assure 
opposition groups of clean elections only because it was sure that it could win clean 
elections.25 However subsequently when the Peso crisis hit the country in 1994 and caused 
the government’s popularity to plummet before elections, it still it did not resort to 
unconstitutional or repressive measures to reverse its decision to guarantee victory at the 
polls. This is contrary to some of the actions that other autocrats have taken to cling to 
power. In 2000, when Milosevic lost the first round of elections in spite of electoral fraud, 
his influence over the constitutional court made it annul election results. 
Another point worth emphasizing is that the threat of mass conflict in the Mexican case was 
relatively moderate. There was no opposition unity preceding 1994 elections – the two main 
opposition parties, rightist National Action Party (PAN) and leftist PRD (Revolutionary 
Democratic Party) (which could have potentially allied with the Zapatista revolutionaries in 
case the government manipulated elections) were ideologically divided. Still, the autocratic 
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 Magaloni 2005, 132-133. 
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PRI was highly sensitive to a relatively modest threat of mass conflict ensuing manipulated 
elections.  
On the contrary, there are several examples of competitive autocrats who blatantly 
manipulated elections in spite of a very high risk of an opposition revolt. In Serbia (2000), 
and Ukraine (2002) especially not only was there opposition unity before elections; there 
was also very high mobilization of civil society. Moreover, the presence of independent 
electoral monitoring during the colored revolution cases compounded the risk of mass 
conflict because incident of electoral manipulation could be unambiguously disseminated to 
the public.  
Alternative Explanation 2: Institutionalization of regime determines whether autocrats 
steal elections or not.  
Thompson and Kuntz in a brief chapter highlight some of the reasons why dictators steal 
elections. According to them a) fear of legal consequences b) economic motives and c) 
political motives are potential reasons for dictators opting to not give up their hold on 
power.  Dictators who often abuse power while in office fear that renouncing their power 
would lead to new governments punishing them by taking them to court. Secondly, the fear 
of losing economic privileges and perks also drives most dictators to cling to their positions 
of authority for e.g. Thirdly, political factors such as the possibility of losing all means of 
accessing public office also induces dictators to steal elections. Thompson and Kuntz also 
mention that psychological and ideological factors might also play a role in leaders wanted 
to sustain their rule despite electoral failure.26 
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 Thompson and Kuntz 2006, Ch. 7 
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 They argue that the legal, economic and political motives that they highlight can be 
subsumed under the causal variable of electoral sultanism. They corroborate Chehabi and 
Linz and Geddes’ explanation that the less the institutionalized a regime, the less likely are 
the chances of it giving up power with ease.27  Personalist dictators like Ferdinand Marcos of 
the Philippines stood to lose all their perks and privileges, which was a plausible reason why 
they chose not to relinquish their grip on power. However well-institutionalized political 
parties can hope to come to power in the future so are more willing to peacefully allow the 







Thomas and Kuntz’s hypothesis is more convincing than Magaloni’s and Howard and 
Roessler’s explanation described above because it is able to explain the variance in 
autocratic behaviour, keeping the potential for opposition rebellion in the aftermath 
constant in different empirical cases. However, this explanation has some important 
deficiencies.  Firstly, the institutionalization of the regime – the strong party in contrast with 
personalist sultan – which Thomas and Kuntz identify as their independent variable is 
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problematic for explaining differentiation of dictatorial response. They should have 
explained what aspect of institutionalization of the regime has a casual effect on strategic 
decision-making of the autocrat in the electoral arena. Strong parties like the Socialist Party 
of Serbia which had inherited material assets, grass-roots support and large membership 
from its predecessor communist predecessor, were still involved in widespread electoral 
cheating in 2000 elections in the country which ultimately led to a citizen revolt. The high 
degree of institutionalization of the Socialist Party of Serbia is a point that Thompson and 
Kuntz acknowledge themselves. They contrast the Socialist Party of Serbia with the weakly 
institutionalized Kilusang Bagong Lipunan under Marcos which quickly disintegrated after 
the opposition contestation of electoral results led to the defection of the armed forces.29  
Yet both these parties were implicated in massive electoral fraud which caused the Yellow 
and Bulldozer Revolutions in Philippines (1986) and Serbia (2000) respectively.   
Secondly, Thompson and Kuntz’s explanation lacks an exact causal mechanism in how 
opposition dynamics divergently impacts strategic calculations of competitive autocrats 
which risk facing mass demonstrations. By not focussing on this aspect, their hypothesis – 
that strongly institutionalized dictatorships are more likely to give up power when they lose 
elections – downplays the unwillingness of all dictatorial regimes to surrender power, 
notwithstanding their level of institutionalization.  
It is merely not the hope of coming to power in the future that makes autocratic parties give 
up electoral power. In fact many dictatorial regimes which peacefully allowed an electoral 
turnover of power during the Third Wave of Democratization had previously engaged in 
extensive malpractice (often at times at the expense of rioting and demonstrations by the 
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opposition) in an attempt to maintain their grip on power. How does a burgeoning 
opposition change a cheating incumbent’s strategic calculation? After all losing hegemonic 
authority to the opposing party can potentially imply that the latter will use the same 
institutional structures of the state that the former incumbents did to keep the latter out of 
power. This is exactly what has happened in most West African countries like Senegal and 
Ghana where the opposition after coming in power has used semi-authoritarian structures 
to maintain their hold in power and often deny the former ruling party a fair game at the 
polls.30 What is it about the threat of mass protests by a strong opposition that causes some 
autocratic parties from manipulating the vote count? 
And some rulers manipulate the vote-count in spite of the possibility of mass protests will 
inevitably pressure them to relinquish power. According to Thompson and Kuntz, “electoral 
sultans” fear losing all their economic and political benefits and facing legal consequence 
and thus cling to power by stealing elections. But then why do they take this chance when 
there is a potential risk that they will ultimately fall from grace through popular revolt? Thus 
Thompson and Kuntz’s explanation fails to show how and why popular pressure differently 




                                                          
30
 See Jourde 2008, Ch. 5 
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Theoretical framework 
My theory is superior to Magaloni’s and Howard and Roessler’s because it holds the threat 
of mass conflict in the event of electoral rigging constant in all cases to identify the actual 
independent variable causing the differentiation in autocratic behavior.  The argument I 
posit is similar to Thompson and Kuntz’s explanation because it is also concerned with 
regime institutionalization. However, I concentrate on the specific aspect of 
institutionalization of power-sharing instead of relying on the simplistic dichotomy of the 
strong party as opposed to a personalist sultan. My explanation, unlike theirs, also seeks to 
provide a causally nuanced understanding of how difference in power structures impacts 
autocratic decision-making with reference to electoral cheating, when there is the 
probability of an opposition rebellion. 
Hypothesis: When the opposition can launch a large-scale civil disobedience to challenge 
fraudulent elections, diffusion or concentration of power in the ruling party will determine 
the decision to rig elections or not. 
Variation in the level of power-sharing in the competitive autocracy determines whether 
autocrats rig elections or not when the threat of a massive civil disobedience ensuing 
fraudulent elections is high.  Diffusion of power in the autocratic party (or high power-
sharing amongst party elites) acts as an impediment against ballot-rigging when there are 
indicators that the opposition is strong enough to launch a large-scale civic disobedience.  
By avoiding tampering with votes, the autocrat will serve the collective interest of party 
members of maintaining party legitimacy and cohesiveness. Autocratic parties with diffused 
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power-sharing fear a situation of mass conflict in the aftermath of tampered electoral 
results can potentially cause the defection of the armed forces and subsequent fresh 
elections that result in a heavy loss of legitimacy for the party causing mass defections of 
voters and party-members.  
Whereas concentration of power (low power-sharing amongst party elites) within the 
autocratic party implies that there are few checks and balances against the top leader’s 
motives to engage in risky behaviour to preserve his own personal power at the expense of 
party legitimacy and cohesiveness. Thus even when faced with the threat of mass conflict, 
the dictator and his clique of loyalists will prefer to rig elections to cling to power.  
Conceptualization and measurement 
I conceive of power in a competitive autocracy as a dichotomous variable. Diffusion of 
power-sharing is represented by rotation in top leadership at most after two terms, 
constitutional checks constraining the presidency, institutionalized procedures of rank-and-
file promotion in the authoritarian party. These rules constrain personalist whim of the ruler 
by giving precedence to party’s interests rather personalist interest of the top leader. 
Concentration of power is represented by the following indicators: protracted rule by the 
top leader (mostly beyond the two-term period), lack of constitutional checks and balances 
curbing the top leader, violation of rank-and-file promotion by top leadership within the 
authoritarian party.31 
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 These indicators have adapted from Barbara Geddes’ indicators used to differentiate between personalist 
and dominant party regimes in Geddes 2003,225 and 227 
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I use the terms mass conflict and mass challenge interchangeably in the paper. Both refer to 
the incidence of a large-scale civil disobedience, as I have already explained earlier.32  The 
threat of mass conflict by the opposition can be assessed by the following indicators 
representing domestic pressure for clean elections:  a) opposition unity – opposition parties 
forming electoral coalitions before elections or jointly endorsing a presidential candidate or 
b) protests/mass demonstrations/revolutionary challenge before elections. 
As has been explained above in the section on alternative explanations, a collective 
opposition front before elections makes difficult for the autocrat to strike bargains with 
selective opposition groups in exchange for their consent in electoral manipulation. It also 
increases the perceived threat of a joint opposition challenge if the autocrat chooses to cling 
to power by manipulating elections. 
Civic challenges - such as mass protests, demonstrations or rebellions by the opposition and 
civil society - against the authoritarian state before elections indicate the high probability of 
collective action against the autocrat if the latter chooses to rig elections. 
Diffused power in competitive autocracies: explaining the decision to defraud elections  
For the authoritarian party characterized by diffusion of power/ high power-sharing, the 
worst possible scenario is disintegration of the party. This is because individual 
factions/blocs within an autocratic party (just as parties in democratic regimes) need to 
ensure institutional cohesiveness of the party in order to have access to state power and 
resources.  
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Using game theory, Geddes elucidates that policy differences may arise in single parties but 
the rival faction will still find it more advantageous to cooperate with the dominant faction 
(the leader’s faction) rather than break away from the party and try to access state 
resources by playing the opposition.33 This dichotomy into a dominant and rival faction 
might come across as simplistic but it is an excellent way of explaining why moments of 
succession to top leadership in dominant parties often generate party splits. The faction 
whose candidate does not make it to top office then has an incentive to breaks away. Good 
examples of intra-party discord are the PRI in Mexico, KMT in Taiwan and KANU in Kenya, 
which have been historically prone to splits during times of leadership succession.34 
Additionally, the inter-generational conflict in parties – the tension between “old guard” 
and “new guard” – as was evident in the PRI in the 1990s and in National Democratic Party 
in Egypt during the new millennium35 highlights the factionalism that exists within dominant 
parties. 
While factionalism can be a key feature of parties where elites share power, in such parties 
the dominant faction finds it unfeasible to marginalize the rival faction and has to appease it 
through concessions. Barbara Geddes (1999) explains internal cohesiveness of single-party 
regimes by highlighting that autocratic parties consist of disparate societal factions 
cooperating under the umbrella of the single-party rather.36 This represents a classic “the 
whole being bigger than the sum of the parts” scenario, where individual factions within the 
party do not have autonomous political influence and need to use the collective party 
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umbrella to access state resources and power. The political careers of party-members are 
contingent on the unity of the party structure and the worst possible outcome for them 
would be disintegration of the party. This institutional configuration of the dominant party 
makes cooperation imperative for members of political parties. 
This probably explains the longevity of political parties with institutionalized power-sharing 
in not just authoritarian regimes but also democratic regimes. These parties are usually 
adept at managing internal conflict resolution and generational change even during periods 
of political turmoil because survival of the party is in the interest of all party factions.37   
Thus due to this imperative of maintaining party cohesiveness, authoritarian parties with 
high power-sharing will be more sensitive to serious challenges by opposition which can 
affect the unity of the party.  Mass conflict led by the opposition to contest fraudulent 
elections is one such challenge which can potentially affect the cohesiveness of the 
authoritarian party/coalition. In the scenario of mass conflict which leads to the defection of 
the armed forces and an electoral recount or fresh elections which brings the opposition in 
power, the party stands to potentially incur very heavy losses. It will lose its legitimacy, 
potentially resulting in mass desertions by voters and party members of the rival faction. 
This can cause the party to even disintegrate, threatening the demise of political careers of 
party members. Thus these autocracies are likely to refrain from electoral fraud and often 
peacefully accept defeat when faced with a strong opposition. In autocracies where 
                                                          
37
 See Brownlee 2007, Ch. 1 and 4. Brownlee explains how durability of authoritarian regimes is casually linked 
to management of elite cohesion with the UMNO in Malaysia and the National Democratic Party in Egypt. Also 
see Friedman and Wong 2008, Part I and II for excellent essays on survival of dominant parties after losing 
incumbency in autocratic and democratic regimes. 
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different political factions within the party exert control over decision-making, a 
strengthening opposition alters the cost-benefit structure of manipulating elections. 
Figure 3 below shows the casual chain that such competitive autocrats fear might 
potentially unfold if they ignore the threat of mass conflict and rig elections. 
 





Therefore, leaders of parties where party elites have a relatively equitable stake in decision-
making will actually be more willing to lose elections rather than undertake the risky act of 
ballot-rigging when there is a high chance that the opposition will lead a popular revolt. 
Even if the party loses dominant control over the state by losing elections, it can still 
maintain its cohesiveness and a) have some access to rent and control over policy-making 
and b) subsequently also hope to contest and even win future elections.  
A simple decision-making tree can show how diffusion of power in autocratic parties 
rationally influences payoffs for committing electoral fraud vis-à-vis those for losing clean 
elections. Figure 4a provides a decision-making tree to show the various possibilities 
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The tree attempts to primarily explain why autocratic parties with diffused power-sharing 
will choose to lose clean elections, rather than attempt to win through ballot rigging when 
the threat of an opposition-led revolt is high. The values assigned to different outcomes are 
arbitrary but they effectively help to elucidate the concept of higher and lower payoffs for 
different autocrats. 
For the sake of simplicity there are two assumptions on which alternative decisions are 
based: a) there are only two actors – the autocratic party and the opposition and b) that the 
autocrat will lose if it does not rig elections.  
The autocrat can decide to commit fraud (F) or not do it (NF). The dominant party will get 
the highest payoff (10) if it wins rigged elections without facing a mass challenge by the 
opposition – outcome (a). This payoff is based on the hegemonic control that the party is 
able to retain over state power and resources. Losing elections has a payoff of 3 for the 
autocratic party, because it will still continue to have some control over resources and 
policy-making through some legislative representation won during the elections. Thus 
Outcome (d), which is the scenario of the autocrat losing elections without ballot rigging, 
reflects this payoff. 
Outcome (b) occurs when the autocrat commits electoral fraud and then faces mass conflict 
but the army represses the latter enabling the party to maintain its dominance. In this case, 
the cost of repression is -2 and thus resulting payoff for the party is 8. 
Yet in the case of outcome (c) mass conflict in the aftermath of electoral fraud causes the 
defection of the armed forces. This alludes to the high possibility of an electoral recount or 
fresh elections ultimately leading to an opposition win. In this case, the autocrat not only 
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loses its dominance over state power and resources, it also stands to lose its legitimacy 
which can result in mass desertions of party members (esp. of the rival factions) and 
defection of future voters. Loss of legitimacy has a cost of -4. Since the payoff for outcome 
(c) is relative to outcome (d) - the payoff the party would have attained by losing unrigged 
elections- the consequent payoff for (c) is (3-4 = -1). 
Outcome (c) is thus the worst possible scenario for this party. On the contrary, in outcome 
(d) where the autocratic party refrains from cheating in elections and loses peacefully, it can 
still hope to have access to some state resources and power due to legislative seats won in 
the elections.  
Although the autocrat cannot fully determine ex ante the army’s decision to side up with 
the opposition or repress it in the event of a mass challenge. Yet the constraint of collective 
decision-making makes the autocrat act more cautiously when the threat of mass challenge 
is present. Therefore when there is a threat of a massive civil disobedience: 
Payoff for accepting electoral defeat < potential payoff for electoral fraud 




In fact the imperative of legitimacy will constrain these competitive autocrats with diffused 
power-sharing from taking the risk of bringing opposition and voters out on the streets. An 
increasingly competitive political system drives these parties to undertake institutional 
reform for making elections fairer – for example, by creating independent election 
commission and minimizing chances of electoral cheating for instance. They do this to 
credibly commit the strong opposition to the electoral process under a neutral 
administrative system, rather than provoking it to delegitimize elections and the dominance 
of the autocratic incumbent by boycotting elections or challenging election results.  
These autocrats might undertake electoral reform to commit opposition to a fairer electoral 
contest with the assurance that they will inevitably emerge victorious in elections because 
of their dominance over resources, media etc. However, when the opposition gets strong 
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enough and the autocrat faces new challenges over time (such as structural crises like 
economic predicaments or wars), they will still not reverse electoral reform or use 
unconstitutional/repressive means to block an opposition victory. This is the reason why 
such competitive autocrats experience the phenomenon of “incremental democratization” 
rather than a total regime transformation. A growing opposition can progressively extract 
concessions to make elections more free and fair from a regime which despite being 
autocratic essentially seeks legitimacy and thus break its dominance. 
When the autocratic party peacefully accepts defeat instead of instigating violence to stay in 
power, it can still play the role of opposition and continue to have access to state resources 
and privileges through some seats in the legislature. Moreover, by preserving its 
cohesiveness the party can still hope to contest elections in the future and possibly even win. 
In this manner, strong autocratic parties are no different from democratic parties, which 
accept defeat yet hope to win again in the future. Kenneth F. Greene makes this point in his 
excellent comparison between dominant parties in autocratic and democratic regimes. 
According to him, the Dominant Party Democratic Regimes (DPDR) in Japan and Italy faced 
electoral defeat in the same way as the Dominant Party Autocratic Regimes (DPAR) in 
Mexico and in Taiwan – mainly through loss of electoral support. When these dominant 
parties lost their hegemonic control over resources such as patronage and access to media, 
voters defected to rising opposition parties.38 For these autocratic parties, repression 
became too costly in the face of a rising opposition and these autocrats accepted electoral 
defeat in a similar way as their democratic counterpart did. 
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Concentrated power in competitive autocracies: explaining the decision to cling to power 
through blatant fraud  
On the contrary, concentration of political power in the autocratic party implies that the 
autocrat serves to retain and enhance personal power of the ruler rather than serve the 
collective interest of party elites. Geddes explains authoritarian coalitions become narrower 
as power becomes more centralized and personalized in these regimes. As rulers become 
more personalistic, they have a tendency to make the authoritarian distributive coalition 
narrow, by excluding threatening members and personally hoarding their resources 
instead.39 This inclination to hoard resources and concentrate power reflects a common 
trait of most personalist rulers.  
In the absence of institutionalized procedures of rank-and-file promotions to higher political 
office, the personalist dictator often employs divide-and-rule policies to keep the 
authoritarian coalition/party divided by favouring certain members (particularly those who 
lack charisma and political ambition) and not others. Thus the dictator’s cohort of lackeys 
(which comprises the minimum winning coalition) actually competes with rival factions 
within the authoritarian party for dictator’s favour.  The dictator’s lackeys often lack a 
support base in society and are mostly dependent on their patrimonial relationship with the 
dictator for access to rent and other perks.40 Geddes explains how in spite of the narrow 
“winning coalition” of the personalist ruler, rival factions in personalist regimes will refrain 
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from plotting to overthrow the leader because of the very high costs incurred if rebellion is 
unsuccessful.41   
For the personalist ruler who has the propensity to concentrate power and his minimum 
winning coalition of loyalists, the worst possible scenario is the personalist ruler’s removal 
from premiership. Unlike the case of autocrats with high power-sharing amongst coalition 
members whose political careers are tied with the survival of the party, the personalist 
leader and his support group are not concerned with party legitimacy and its cohesiveness. 
Their political survival is contingent on the personalist ruler’s ability to retain the highest 
office rather than the institution of the party itself. The loss of personal power implies a 
permanent loss of political perks most of which are extra-constitutional) for the dictator and 
his clique. The consequent loss of legal immunity can also imply that the dictator and his 
cohort will be subjected to myriad legal battles and be impeached by political rivals for his 
former abuses in power. 
This is the precise reason why ruling parties dominated by strongmen are less likely to be 
receptive to opposition pressure for clean elections. If the government rigs elections and the 
armed forces acquiesce to the demand of the challengers for fresh elections, there is a high 
chance that the personalist ruler will lose office. This is the worst-case scenario for the 
personalist ruler and his supporters.  
Yet losing office this way will result in the same worst possible scenario as losing office 
through clean elections. In both cases, the personalist leader attains the disastrous 
outcomes related with his removal from office.  While the defection of the armed forces 
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cannot be accurately predicted ex ante, the personalist dictator will know for sure that his 
party is losing at the polls due to the government’s control of the election commission. 
Therefore, he will be more inclined to take the risk of rigging ballots to cling to power.  
Figure 4b provides a tree to show the various possibilities resulting in the aftermath of 
electoral fraud and their payoffs for autocrats with low institutionalization/high personalism. 
The autocrat can decide to engage in fraud (F) or not (NF). Again like the tree in Figure 4a, 
this tree also assumes that (i) there are only two main players – the autocrat and the 
opposition and (ii) the autocrat will lose elections if it does not rig them. 
Outcome (a) represents the payoff of winning rigged elections without any opposition 
challenge, which is 10.  For the personalist dictator and his cohort, losing elections is the 
worst scenario because the ruler loses power of the highest office. Thus the payoff for 
completely losing political power will be 0 but loss of personal power can lead to other costs 
for the autocrat – like the possibility of myriad legal battles and end of political career. Thus 
assuming that these long-term costs have a payoff of -4, the personalist dictator will have a 
total payoff of -4 in this scenario. 
 Thus payoff for outcome (d) where the autocrat loses clean elections is -4. If rigged 
elections by the personalist dictator result in mass conflict, two scenarios can result. In 
outcome (b) the army will repress the mass challenge. The cost of repression is -2, yet the 
autocrat will continue to hold his dominant position, which makes the payoff 8 in this case. 
However in outcome (c) the army will choose to defect and side with the opposition that 
challenges fraudulent elections. In this case fresh elections will lead to the opposition 
coming into power and loss of personal power of the authoritarian incumbent and the 
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possible termination of his political career which yields a value of 0. Yet possible subjection 
to legal penalties and political retribution by succeeding incumbents adds further costs of -4. 
This possibility will again result in the worst payoff for the personalist leader and his support 
coalition which is -4. Thus losing clean elections has the same payoff as the possibility of 
losing through the defection of armed forces in the event of mass conflict. So when the 
threat of mass conflict is high: 
Payoff for accepting electoral defeat = potential payoff of electoral fraud 
 
This is the reason why ruling parties which are led by strongmen are less likely to initiate 
electoral reforms to make elections more fair and free. Insecurity about the consequences 
of removal from office causes them to retain tight control of electoral system.  
Figure 5 provides diagrammatically summarizes the above discussion of my theoretical 
mechanism: 
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Case-studies 
Now a discussion of my case-studies will show how payoffs for electoral fraud for different 
regimes varied according to differences in power-sharing within the ruling autocratic party.  
First I will discuss the case of Serbia where concentration of power within the ruling party 
allowed the leader Slobodan Milosevic to take the risk of rigging elections in spite of a 
formidable opposition coalition. Then I will discuss the case of Mexico where diffusion of 
power-sharing amongst the party elite facilitated a more cautious approach in the electoral 
arena. 
The rise of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia 
Serbia was part of the communist confederation of Yugoslavia, along with six other 
republics of Montenegro, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia and Kosovo.  
The country was based on power-sharing by representatives of these ethnic republics at the 
federal level in the League of Communists. Jozip Broz Tito, a communist strongman was the 
first President of Yugoslavia of the “Second Yugoslavia” which lasted from after World War 2 
to 1991. Tito was an avid promoter and member of the Non-Aligned movement during the 
Cold War. 
In 1986, six years after Tito’s death, Milosevic rose as a rising leader in the Yugoslav system 
when Ivan Stambolic, a Titoist veteran of the Serbian League of Communists, appointed him 
as the President of the Central Committee of the Serbian League of Communists. Milosevic 
was driven by the need to create a more unitary Yugoslav system, as opposed to a looser 
federation advocated by Croatia’s leader Milan Kucan. These conflicting approaches to 
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restructuring a debilitated confederacy were to be the instigator of ethnic wars that would 
subsequently break up Yugoslavia. 42 
Concentration of power in the Socialist Party of Serbia: Milosevic’s personalist control over 
the party 
As Yugoslavia edged closer to the brink of disintegration, Milosevic saw nationalism as an 
important opportunity to consolidate his own authority in a communist system in Serbia 
which had lost its legitimacy after the breakup of the Soviet Union and seize as much 
territory as possible for “Greater Serbia”.43  Using extra-constitutional methods he started 
facilitating mass protests by radical nationalist groups in Serb minority republics like Kosovo 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina and autonomous provinces like Vojvodina.  These mass 
demonstrations were termed as the “happening of the people”.44 Milosevic was essentially 
using Serbs in other republics and provinces as tools for “advancing his own power within 
and outside Serbia”. 45  
However, in Serbia Milosevic’s nationalist message was allowing him to get overly powerful 
in the public domain and also within his party.46 He was using raw “street power” of the 
Serbian majority to circumvent party hierarchy in his own League of Communist in Serbia.  
Cohen describes is as the essence of Milosevic’s anti-bureaucratic revolution in Serbia 
initiated in 1990.47 Gradually Milosevic was leading the faction of radical nationalists within 
the Serbian League of Communists, who were vociferously challenging the Serbian leaders 
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of the old Titoist order – like Stambolic and Pavlovic- who believed in multi-ethnic solidarity 
and brotherhood with other republics.  At the Eight Session of the League of Communist of 
Serbia, Milosevic asserted himself in Serbian politics by getting his rivals from the party; 
Pavlovic was removed from his position on the Serbian Party Presidium and Stambolic was 
replaced as President of Serbia’s collective state presidency.48 In tandem with these 
developments, Milosevic struck an alliance with nationalist Serbian intellectuals and brought 
mass media under his control to use as a tool for the purpose to spreading propaganda.49 
Due to the withering appeal of communism brought by the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, the League of Communist refashioned itself as the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) after 
the introduction of multi-party elections at the republic and federal level in 1990. On 16-17 
July 1989, a Unification Congress at Belgrade saw the fusion of the League of Communists of 
Serbia with the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Serbia (SAWP) to form the SPS. The 
merger allowed the former communists to gain $160,000,000 in material and financial 
assets.50 This new organization which had a fundamental continuity with the former League 
of Communists51 and its centralized, hierarchical style of decision-making, also inherited its 
predecessor’s control over the media, police, military and economy.52 Thus SPS, advantaged 
by its superior assets, membership and grass-roots support, came to be the hegemonic 
party under the chairmanship of Milosevic.  
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Milosevic made an attempt to recruit younger cadres in the SPS and also give important 
positions at the republic and federal level to notable Serbs.53 However, this was just an 
attempt to portray a widening of the power-sharing coalition but Milosevic never seriously 
contemplated giving up real power. Dobrica Cosic, a Serbian writer and proponent of a 
united Yugoslavia, was invited by Milosevic to become the President of the Third Yugoslavia 
in 1992 – which only comprised Serbia and Montenegro. And Milan Panic, an American 
businessman of Serbian roots, was also invited to take the position of the federal Prime 
Minister.54  Yet subsequently their tendency to disagree with Milosevic regarding the ethnic 
wars that Milosevic fuelled in Bosnia and Kosovo subjected them to expulsion from Serbian 
politics.55 
Even though Milosevic initiated the SPS in Serbia’s epoch of controlled multi-party elections 
democratic politics with a new air of openness by giving former Marxist dissidents and 
intellectuals important positions in the party.56However, Milosevic had used his nationalist 
appeal amongst the populace as a warrant to completely centralize decision-making power. 
Thus a strong party like SPS, whose membership reached about 500,000 in 1996 and which 
represented many important personalities in Serbian politics, had become hijacked by the 
charismatic leadership of Milosevic. 57 
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Lack of constitutional checks and balances against the Presidency 
Before the elections Milosevic drafted the new constitution of the republic, despite 
demands of the opposition to let elected officials do it after the first multi-party elections. 
Interestingly enough, the constitution laid down rules for an immensely strong presidency, 
which not only sought to marginalize opposition parties in politics but also minimize 
incentive for dissent within the hegemonic party. For instance, the President had sweeping 
powers to take measures without the consent of the parliament and could not be 
challenged in the constitutional court. The directly elected President of Serbia was not 
accountable to any constitutional body and provisions for his recall through a referendum 
required far more votes than were necessary for his election. 58 Thus the constitution for 
Serbia set stage for personalist rule.  
The protracted presidency 
Milosevic was constantly devising new ways of prolonging his tenure as the top leader. After 
serving two terms as the President of Serbia, he stood for the President of Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1997 elections – a position he had to take over since he was hesitant 
to violate the constitution of Serbia and become President of Serbia for the third time. In 
2000, he called early elections at the presidential, federal and republican level. But before 
this, he and his governing coalition changed the constitution to allow for direct elections for 
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the President of the FRY, and indirect elections for the President at the republic level. This 
was done to preserve Milosevic’s position in power.59 
Colluding with Milosevic to preserve his dominant political position was a class of cronies he 
had created whose patrimony and state power was linked to the Serbian president’s 
position. The ruling elite of the SPS and also indirectly of the Yugoslav Left political party 
(JUL) headed by Milosevic’s wife, Mirjana Milosevic were controlled by Milosevic. The 
regime loyalists comprised a motley group of partisans of the old regime, the non-
communist nationalists, modernizers, technocratic reformists and smugglers.60 Within the 
ruling coalition, Milosevic exercised maximum control over decision-making and disregarded 
opinions of even his small team of advisors. 61 
The opposition in Serbia before 2000 elections 
Milosevic won two elections as the President of Serbia in 1990 and 1992 led his party to win 
five legislative elections at the republic and federal level (in 1990, two in 1992, 1993 and 
1996). However, with each year the margin of victory for the SPS declined. Over time the 
system in Serbia became more competitive rather than just being completely dominated by 
a hegemonic party. 62The main opposition parties to the centre and centre-left were the 
Democratic Party (DS) and Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) which opposed the ethnic wars 
in the 1990s and wanted to see Serbia as a liberal democracy. While on the right, there was 
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the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) comprising 
nationalist and ultra-nationalist groups.63 
Ideological, political and personal divisions amongst the opposition groups had always 
dampened their effort to oust Milosevic.64 Additionally, Milosevic’s nationalist strategy for 
political survival as the top leader in Serbia and rump state of Yugoslavia proved fruitful in 
the 1990s. The public, along with the opposition, remained aloof from the goal of genuine 
democratization due to the wars Milosevic had fuelled in neighbouring Croatia, Bosnia and 
later Kosovo by funding and arming radical Serb groups.  65  
The “Bulldozer” Revolution in the making 
However, there were clear signs that Milosevic’s regime was suffering from lack of 
legitimacy as the millennium approached.66 After Milosevic had acquiesced to NATO’s terms 
for ending the war in Kosovo in 1999, he was confronted with the threat of opposition 
forces focussing on the need for genuine democracy in Yugoslavia and Serbia.  
It was becoming obvious to Milosevic that the forthcoming elections would not be an easy 
win for him. A nascent student movement by the name of Otpor had started campaigning 
against Milosevic before the elections in 2000. By July 2000, Otpor had nearly 30-40,000 
activists, 120 local branches and seven regional centers.67 The opposition parties, under 
pressure from Otpor, were gradually beginning to realize the importance of achieving 
genuine unity to oust Milosevic. They unified as the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, to 
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contest forthcoming elections. They strongly demanded free and fair elections. This demand 
was put forth in a large protest gathering in Belgrade on 14 April, which was attended by 
some 200,000 citizens.68  Due to the ethnic genocide that Milosevic’s policies provoked in 
Yugoslavia, Western countries were keen to see the ouster of the Eastern European dictator. 
The EU, keen on seeing Serbia democratize had given financial assistance to bolster 
democratic parties and civic groups.69  
Milosevic’s refusal to step down: payoffs for electoral vis-à-vis payoffs for accepting 
electoral defeat  
The opposition candidate Vojislav Koštunica supported collectively by the DOS and the rising 
Otpor movement soundly beat Milosevic in the 2000 presidential elections - 48.96 percent 
to 38.62 percent.  This was in spite of many irregularities committed by the government-
controlled Federal Election Commission (SIK) – like blatant rigging of ballots and intimidation 
of voters in some instances.  One of these glaring irregularities was the announcement by 
SIK that Kostunica had won 49.9 per cent of the total votes (and not a 51 percent majority 
required for a decisive win) and thus a run-off election was required.70  
This was rejected by the opposition parties which starting inciting mobilizing the masses for 
a massive civil disobedience. On October 5, the Federal Constitutional Court annulled 
election results of the first round. This proved to be the last nail in the coffin for Milosevic’s 
political career. An overwhelming 700,000 people came out on the streets to protest this 
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move.71 Finally the regime relented to accept the results of September 24 elections after the 
military and riot police refused to break fire on the protestors. This move of the security 
forces to not undertake hard-line tactics reflected cracks in the regime. 72 
Why did the political opposition and civic groups’ demand to hold clean elections not 
prevent Milosevic’s regime from rigging elections? The reason was that Milosevic was 
supremely powerful in the regime – he used the SPS as a base of cronies to maintain his 
political supremacy in Serbia and Yugoslavia. For an autocratic party in which political power 
is concentrated in the office of paramount leader, the worst possible outcome is the leader 
losing this office.  
Due to his control of the SIK, Milosevic had realized that fair elections would result in his 
electoral loss which could have grave consequences for him and his cronies. Firstly, this 
implied the loss of perks and prerogatives of premiership for Milosevic but also loss of 
patronage and political positions of his cronies, many of whom had built their political 
careers through personal affiliations with the charismatic President.73  Secondly, as a typical 
dictator who had become increasingly personalist over time, Milosevic had seriously abused 
power. The nationalist wars that Milosevic had started to marginalize opponents of his 
authoritarian policies had disastrous consequences: ethnic genocide, breakup of Yugoslavia 
and imposition of UN sanctions on Serbia. These UN sanctions thoroughly impoverished the 
country and the consequent breakdown of routine economic activity instigated the 
criminalization of Serb society. Mafia gangs controlling illegal business activity - often under 
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government’s auspices - and breakdown of the judicial system became a routine feature of 
Serbia.74 And while most Serbs were languishing in poverty, the elite of Milosevic’s regime 
had amassed vast riches, which one critic had labelled as the “great robbery of the 
people”.75 
Due to this rampant abuse of authority, Milosevic had strong reasons to believe that he 
would have to face legal battles without the impunity afforded by his political office. 
Moreover during his tenure as the leader, Milosevic had purged many other leaders who 
disagreed with his political manoeuvres. Many from this purged lot had joined the ranks of 
the opposition. For example Cosic, the former Yugoslav President, whom Milosevic had 
purged, had joined the strongly anti-Milosevic Otpor.  For Milosevic accepting electoral loss 
opened the possibility of the return of these purged elites to power in a new government 
who could seek punitive action against him.76 
Yet the high mobilization of the opposition also posed a decision-making dilemma for 
Milosevic. There were clear signs that continued popular pressure for the regime to relent 
would ultimately cause Milosevic to step down. When Kostunica won the first round of 
elections, countless came out on the streets to celebrate his victory. Aggressively chanting 
"Kill Yourself Slobodan and Save Serbia," over 40,000 people marched through Belgrade 
celebrating Kostunica’s victory in the first round of elections. Thousands also gathered in 
Serbia's two other major cities, Novi Sad and Nis, to celebrate Kostunica’s triumph even 
before the official results were announced.  Kostunica had warned that any attempts by 
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Milosevic to tamper with the vote will result in the opposition protesting for their “for as 
long as it takes." 77 Thus the risk of mass demonstrations following any attempt to unfairly 
manipulate election results was very high.   
However, the threat that popular pressure would ultimately force him to give up power had 
the same payoff as legitimately accepting electoral defeat.  This is because relenting power 
as a consequence of popular pressure also implied the same loss of political power and legal 
impunity. 
Milosevic could not have fully known what the army’s reaction would be if mass protests 
broke out ex ante.  He knew he had the support of the army chief of staff Nebojša Pavkovic, 
who had openly sided with Milosevic before elections.78 Just after election campaigning 
resulted in a huge turnout for Kostunica, the army chief indicated his support for the 
Milosevic regime by warning that any sort of disturbances by the opposition during 
elections will be curbed.79 This is why Milosevic took the risk to hang on to power through 
electoral fraud and then the annulment of the election results. He tried his luck in clinging to 
power, because the possible defection of the army in the event of a mass conflict was a loss 
just as great as accepting electoral defeat.  
Finally the regime relented by accepting the results of the first round of elections. Had 
power not been so centralized in the autocracy, other stake-holders in the regime would 
have taken a more precautionary stance in the electoral arena. As a consequence of 
Milosevic’s ambition to maintain personal power in spite of popular protests, SPS and its 
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allied parties (JUL and SRS) lost a great deal of legitimacy and political support. After coming 
to power the new ruling elite of the DOS forced the ancien regime to accept the political 
compromise to hold elections at the republican level in December. These parties found 
themselves in much a weakened position and had to compromise with the DOS. In 
December, the loss of legitimacy translated into a major defeat for the members of the old 
regime. SPS and SRS together gained only 24 percent of the mandates, while JUL gained not 
one single seat, and DOS won 70.4 percent of the seats.80  
Mexico – The origins of the PRI and the pact of elite power-sharing  
The Institutional Republic Party (PRI) in Mexico can trace its origins to the Mexican 
revolution (1910 – 1920), which was a protracted popular struggle against the long-ruling 
dictator, Porfirio Diaz. By the end of the revolution, victorious warlords established a 
political organization to rule the country in the aftermath of chaos. The party was intended 
to bring revolutionary leaders, local bosses and   extant political parties under the umbrella 
of one political party and negotiate a pact of power-sharing.81  
Power-sharing amongst elites in the PRI made the party prone to splits. For instance, PRI 
had been historically vulnerable to factionalization over selection of the presidential 
nominee.  In 1988, a major split resulted in the creation of the Party of the Democratic 
Revolution (PRD) when the Cardenas, the presidential candidate supported by the leftist 
faction within PRI was not nominated for the presidency.82 Ironically this susceptibility to 
splitting also made elite cooperation absolutely imperative. In parties with a diffused power-
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structure, interdependent constituent factions find it imperative to maintain unified party 
umbrella. Particularly in hegemonic parties like the PRI in Mexico, Koumitang (KMT) in 
Taiwan and Grand National Party (GNP), which did not have an ideology providing an 
adhesive of legitimacy, elite splitting was always a major threat to the hegemonic survival of 
the party and eventually contributed to the demise in the hegemonic status of these 
parties.83 
Magaloni describes three ways in which PRI thwarted party splits. Firstly, lavish electoral 
campaigns and regular victories at the polls gave an image of invincibility to the dominant 
party. Secondly, distribution of spoils and patronage to party members maintained their 
incentive to stay with the party. Thirdly, electoral rules were intended to raise the costs of 
entry for potential opposition parties in the electoral arena.  84 
Magaloni argues that it was not repression or electoral fraud that made the PRI dominant in 
Mexico. It was rather its ability to distribute patronage to its electoral constituents and 
making people economically dependent on the party-state which made the people willingly 
vote for the party. Throughout the period of the important substitution (ISI) during the 1960 
and 1970s, the peasantry and workers which comprised the large base of depended on the 
party-dominated state for land and wages respectively.85 
Kenneth F. Greene makes a similar point. He argues that PRI’s resources dominance – its 
control over economy and media particularly – discouraged the formation of opposition 
groups which could not compete with this powerful party to win the loyalty of the median 
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voter. This is why the opposition parties which existed operated at ideological extremes and 
had a limited base of radical voters who wanted their leaders to pursue policy-oriented 
goals rather than provide them with patronage via access to political office. 86 
The constrained presidency and supremacy of party interests 
The President who was an elected member of the party could not seek re-election for 
another term in office. This regular turnover of personnel in the highest office was intended 
specifically intended to thwart the emergency of personalist rule. The preceding thirty-year 
dictatorship of Diaz had left a deep scar in the memory of the warlords who overthrew him 
during the Mexican Revolution. Thus they wanted to thwart creating an organization which 
could be hijacked my personalist ambition. Magaloni explains how this system of rank-and-
file succession to the highest office gave rivals within the coalition an incentive to wait for 
their turn rather than scheme assassinations against the incumbent president and one 
another.87 
The Mexican presidency also remained “captured” by party interests, even though that was 
not very salient in the constitutional checks and balances. Yet as Boix and Svolik argue, 
Mexican presidents had leeway to appoint cabinets and nominate successors, this was done 
is accordance with the “interests of the party bureaucracy, its allies in the society (such as 
the labor movement), and the governing class in the legislature and across state 
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governments.”88 Therefore presidents could not build their own support base that could 
upset the institutional setup that had been put in place since the 1930s.89 
Casar makes a similar point in his chapter on executive-legislative relationships in PRI-led 
Mexico. He argues that while the presidents had power well beyond constitutional 
stipulations, these informal powers had institutional roots deriving from the party and 
electoral systems and not from the abuse of personal power.90 
Economic change in Mexico and rise of the opposition  
However, in the 1980s things changed for the PRI. The PRI like many other hegemonic 
parties which lose their ideological/revolutionary legitimacy over decades, like the 
Communist Party in China   (CCP) or the KMT in Taiwan have to employ “temporary 
projects” to delay democratization and stay in power. Economic development is probably 
the most important project for permanently delaying democratization.91 However, the debt 
crisis as a result of the ISI during the 1980s triggered neoliberal reforms to resurrect the 
economy. De la Madrid’s administration (1982-1988) initiated these reforms which would in 
the long-term reduce the state’s corporatist control over the economy and hence adversely 
affect PRI’s hegemony. This also marked the rise of Western-educated technocratic elite in 
the PRI who were eager to implement economic reforms in the PRI.92 
This generational change in the PRI during the 1980s exacerbated the tensions between the 
“old guard” in the party which was more oriented towards populist policies and the new 
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technocratic elite. In 1987, the candidate of the faction comprising these technocratic elite, 
Carlos Salinas was chosen as the presidential candidate for the presidential polls in 1988. 
Thus when Chuauctemos Cardenas the leader of the “old guard” comprising left-leaning 
politicians which were against rapid neo-liberal restructuring, was not nominated as the 
presidential candidate, this faction broke from PRI . The result was the creation of the Party 
of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) which contested separately as the 1988.93 
At the same time the National Action Party (PAN) had been making inroads in the Northern 
part of the country – an economically vibrant area which was becoming increasingly tied to 
the U.S. economy via North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). The people in the 
northern localities were no longer economically dependent on the state and had defected 
to the side of the PAN, which had supported neoliberal policies.94 
PRI’s decision to rig 1988 presidential elections 
The PRI found itself in a rather vulnerable position in the presidential elections of 1988.  The 
PAN and the PRD, in spite of ideological divisions amongst them, had decided to jointly 
support PRD leader Cardenas as the candidate for the President.  
The 1988 elections were most definitely rigged elections, even though it is not known 
whether PRI padded its victory or manufactured a wider margin of victory. It took this risk 
because it was able to co-opt the PAN by offering it side-payments to accept fraudulent 
results. PAN, a typical moderate opposition party with a weak support base, was willing to 
collude with the government in exchange for top ministerial positions. It’s relatively weaker 
strength as a strong alternative to the ruling party and ideological/policy deviation from that 
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of the populist PRD pushed it to act opportunistically and increase its own political gains by 
essentially legitimizing the autocratic order.95 The PRD with its radical voter base contested 
these election results citing allegations of fraud and consequently lost many of its political 
workers to post-electoral violence.96 However the opportunistic PAN wanted to maximize its 
political gains in the autocratic system.  
PRI’s decision to defraud 1994 presidential elections – payoffs for clean election as 
opposed to payoffs for rigging elections 
Even though the PRI used electoral fraud to win elections in 1988, it refrained from electoral 
fraud in the legislative elections of 1994. PRI’s decision was triggered by the audacious 
opposition that the party faced in 1994. The Zapatista rebellion in the Mexico’s southern 
agricultural state of Chiapas came almost as a surprise to the PRI, which had just signed the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was intended to intensify Mexico’s 
trade ties with U.S. and Canada. It was led by the Zapatista National Liberation Front (EZLN) 
–mainly peasants of indigenous Mayan origin- who protested the neoliberal shift in PRI’s 
economic policies which had economically disadvantaged the poor peasantry of the Chiapas. 
With their faces hidden behind ski masks, around 3000 Zapatista guerrillas declared war 
against the state in Mexico. On 1 January when the NAFTA was supposed to come into 
effect, these guerrillas seized towns and cities in Chiapas, freed prisoners from a jail at a 
large state municipality and set fire to several police buildings and military barracks in the 
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area. Although the EZLN enjoyed brief success, their actions instigated a faceoff with the 
army ultimately leadings to a cease-fire agreement on 12 January 1994. 
Amongst other demands for social and economic redistribution to the indigenous 
population, the EZLN cogently put forth a demand for free and fair elections.  And even 
though they were a rag-tag army of rebels with little institutional basis for representing the 
masses, their persuasive agenda for political change had the effect of emboldening the 
opposition in Mexico. On January 27, Mexico’s three leading political parties and five small 
parties signed a pact to push for reforms to streamline elections. The pact called for 
lowering the cap on campaign spending to create a more level playing field for the dominant 
PRI and the opposition and independent investigations to curb the incidence of electoral 
fraud.97 There were also signs that the PRD, with its radical leftist stance, would 
opportunistically ally with the Zapatista rebels to protest if the PRI threatened to rig 
elections. 98  
Additionally, as the presidential election approached the Zapatistas hardened their rhetoric.  
In June, the leader of the group, Subcommandate Marcos threatened there will be a civil 
war if there was no “democratic opening” in the forthcoming elections.99 Over time 
Zapatistas were able to attract a following of those opposed to autocratic rule. Weeks 
before the elections, over 4000 academics, peasants, observers and journalists travelled to 
jungles of the Chiapas to attend the “National Democratic Convention” organized by the 
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EZLN. The purpose of this event was to create a formidable civilian force capable of 
overturning the election results in case they were fraudulent.100 
Therefore there was a genuine threat that rigged elections would spark a situation of a mass 
conflict that could possibly warrant the intervention of the army. At a time when Mexico 
was going through the crucial phase of trade integration with the U.S. and Canada, mass 
conflict following rigged elections could also disrupt foreign investment.101 Since the PRI 
could count on strong popular support in the 1994 polls, President Salinas tried to neutralize 
the Zapatista rebellion by cooperating with the PAN to pass a major legislation which 
created an independent Federal Electoral Institute.102 With the help of the PANistas in the 
Congress, he facilitated passage of electoral reforms which released the Federal Electoral 
Institute (IFE) from the clutches of government control.   
Magaloni argues the credible threat of a mass conflict made the PRI tie its hands ex ante by 
giving independence to the IFE. 103 However my comparative perspective on autocratic 
behaviour seeks to understand why the PRI responded to the threat of the mass conflict 
when clearly other autocracies did not. Magaloni argues that the ruling party will commit 
fraud as long as it produces a marginal payoff that will compensate the legitimacy deficit. 
Conversely if the legitimacy deficit appears to great ex ante, the ruling party will not engage 
in fraud. 104 
However, this line of reasoning applies to ruling parties like the PRI where power is diffused. 
As I have explained above, due to the representation of various factions and stake-holders 
within the PRI, the party had always been sensitive to the threat of splitting. Yet the 
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preservation of legitimacy and cohesiveness of the party was absolutely essential for 
individual factions to advance their political careers.105 In 1994, an emboldened civil society 
and rising opposition encouraged by the bold tactics of the EZLN implied that electoral 
rigging could possibly lead to a large-scale civil disobedience.106 The PRI did not want to risk 
a situation of a mass conflict which would lead to the intervention of the army and 
delegitimization of the electoral process. 
Magaloni argues that the PRI only gave independence of the IFE in 1994 because it was sure 
it could win without electoral rigging.107 However, even after the Peso crisis hit the country 
affecting the credibility of the PRI, the latter did not reverse its decision of limiting its 
institutional capacity to steal elections. In 1994, clean elections still brought the PRI 
candidate Ernesto Zedillo into power because the populace did not want to risk a change in 
leadership amidst economic uncertainty. Yet as the crisis prolonged and PRI lost control of 
its patronage machine, the party’s support waned in its traditional electoral constituencies. 
The party did not become repressive vis-à-vis a rising opposition to prolong its incumbency. 
It in fact it responded to the opposition’s demands by further electoral reforms – a major 
one being complete independence of the IFE - which aimed at creating a more level playing 
ground for the opposition.108 In 1998, the PRI lost its legislative majority and in 2000 the 
party peacefully lost the Presidency to PAN’s candidate Vincent Fox. As the opposition grew 
stronger – particularly the moderate opposition – the PRI found it increasingly less 
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In this thesis I explore why opposition pressure to hold free and fair elections prevents some 
competitive autocrats from rigging elections but not others. I argue that diffusion of power 
or concentration of power (or high/low power-sharing amongst party elites) is the 
independent variable causing variation in response of competitive autocracies. Diffusion of 
power in the party/high degree of power-sharing amongst party elites will cause the party 
to refrain from rigging elections when there is a threat that the opposition will launch a 
mass conflict ex post. This decision is influenced by the need to maintain party legitimacy 
because a situation of a mass conflict can potentially cause the defection of the armed 
forces and fresh elections. In such a situation, the party stands to incur heavy losses of 
legitimacy, resulting in defection of its voters and party members potentially causing the 
party to disintegrate. Since individual careers of party elites are tied to the umbrella of the 
party, the ruling party serves the collective interest of maintaining party legitimacy and 
cohesiveness by choosing not to rig elections. Using a simple decision-making tree I explain 
that for parties with high power-sharing losing clean elections actually has a higher payoff 
than that for rigging elections, when the opposition can credibly challenge the dictator. This 
is because losing clean elections will ensure party legitimacy and cohesiveness thus enabling 
the party to have some access to political office as the opposition and continue contesting 
elections in the future.  
Whereas concentration of power in the party/low power-sharing amongst party elites 
implies that there is no effective check on the personalist ambitions of top leadership within 
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the party. Thus even if there is a credible threat of an opposition-led challenge in the event 
of fradulent elections, the personalist dictator and his narrow clique of loyalists are likely to 
rig elections to maintain their position of supremacy. This is because for the dictator and his 
support group, losing clean elections has the same payoff as triggering mass conflict which 
can lead to the defection of the armed forces and fresh elections. The simple decision-
making tree shows that both these strategic actions will result in the worst possible 
outcome of the loss of personal power for the dictator and his cohort and potential 
subjection to legal penalties and punishments for abuse of power.  
My analysis of the case of the Socialist Party of Serbia shows how concentration of power in 
the Milosevic-led presidency meant that the leadership was not concerned with legitimacy 
of SPS. Instead the party became a vehicle for maintaining Milosevic’s personal power. 
Before the 2000 elections the burgeoning opposition vociferously demanded free elections 
through mass demonstrations. Yet Milosevic chose to blatantly rig elections through his 
control over the Federal Election Commission (SIK). This move triggered mass 
demonstrations of the unified opposition parties and civil society, which finally led to the 
defection of the state’s security apparatus. Thus fresh elections brought the opposition’s 
candidate Vojislav Koštunica into power and delegitimized the Socialist Party of Serbia – a 
fact that was reflected in the party’s dismal performance in legislative elections held 
subsequently in the same year.  
While the case of the PRI in Mexico presents a different scenario. It shows how credible 
power-sharing amongst the elite in the PRI- quintessentially represented by regular turnover 
in the presidency – made the party sensitive to challenges by a burgeoning opposition. 
While the PRI had previously engaged in electoral fraud, the Zapatista rebellion in 1994 and 
W a q a r  | 61 
 
consequent emboldening of civil society and its rising demands for democratization posed a 
threat of a mass conflict over allegations of fraudulent elections. This kept the party away 
from electoral rigging in 1994 presidential elections. President Salinas pushed the legislative 
bill for creating an independent Federal Electoral Institute. In spite of the fact that the PRI 
won the 1994 elections, the Peso crisis in the same year progressively weakened the party’s 
position and strengthened the major opposition party, the PAN. Yet despite its weakening 
political position, the PRI progressively carried out electoral reforms when it was pressured 
by a vociferous opposition to create an even playing field in the electoral arena. The 
imperative of maintaining a legitimate party, made it peacefully give up power to the 
opposition through clean elections rather than undertake any unconstitutional action to 
retain its dominant position. It lost its legislative majority in 1998 and finally the presidency 
in 2000.  
Thus my theory has implications for understanding why autocratic parties are able to 
sustain even after they lose their hegemonic status. The analysis of my case-studies show 
that the imperative of maintaining party legitimacy - a consequence of elite power-sharing – 
when the party is faced with a strong opposition can potentially prolong its longevity. 
Political prudence comes when there are more actors involved in the decision-making 
process of the dominant political institution. And in fact low power-sharing can lead to the 
demise of parties in the face of popular pressures because risky behaviour can be expected 
when there is only one leader calling the shots.  
Way in his work regarding the Colored Revolutions argues that dictators lacking a strong 
base of a party were the ones ousted during these electoral upheavals. He identifies the 
presence of a strong party which was more than just a machine for doling patronage – most 
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typically with “a highly salient ideology, a history of violent struggle, or a long track record of 
electoral success” – as a condition for autocratic stability.110 Yet paradoxically party strength 
is very important for a peaceful transition when opposition becomes sturdy enough to pose 
a large-scale challenge against the regime. Thompson and Kuntz argue that 
“institutionalized interests” of strong communist parties in Nicaragua and Poland made 
them concede electoral defeat when faced with a strong opposition.111 These 
institutionalized interests can actually be more specifically defined as institutionalized 
power-sharing within parties which made them sensitive to the rising challenge of the 
opposition and the altered geo-political circumstances after the demise of the Soviet Union. 
The prudent choice of party elites to maintain party legitimacy by stepping down from 
power bore fruit because they were able to maintain party durability and continue to 
partake in politics. In fact in 1995, just a few years after giving up power, the former 
communist party in Poland was able to make an impressive comeback in presidential and 
parliamentary elections.112  
Many other states where single parties had dominated since the country’s independence 
allowed peaceful transitions of power thus maintaining the capability to have legitimate 
access to state resources as major opposition parties and contest future elections. This kept 
these parties intact even after losing incumbency. African states have often been considered 
personalist or neo-patrimonial because of their underdeveloped political institutions and 
strong presidencies.113 However, many dominant parties in single-party African were stable 
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institutions for power-sharing, even though formal rules often did capture the extent of 
power distribution in these parties. For instance, consider the case of Senegal. Abdou Diouf 
– the second President of the country and the Socialist Party’s (PS) second leader – was 
constitutionally a strong president. Yet the considerable democratic norms of elite politics in 
Senegal thwarted Diouf from purging, exiling, or imprisoning party rivals. 114 Diouf also 
showed a genuine commitment to democratization to keep the ruling party a legitimate 
institution and thus pressure from opposition parties made him initiate a major 
breakthrough reform to create an independent election commission (ONEL) before the 2000 
elections.115 Thus when a strong opposition coalition Sopi - Alternance 2000 – supporting 
presidential candidate Abdoulaye Wade came to challenge the incumbent Socialist Party, 
the latter chose to accept defeat peacefully rather than resort to electoral rigging. The PS 
continues to be the main opposition in Senegal till date. 
Yet where power was concentrated in autocracies, leaders dealt a brutal blow to party 
legitimacy when they chose to cling to power and blatantly rig elections in spite of a 
formidable opposition. Post-communist political systems where the Colored Revolutions 
followed Serbia’s precedent - Rose revolution in Georgia (2003) Orange Revolution in 
Ukraine (2004) and Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005) - have been typically characterized 
by fluidity and polarization with leading personalities from the preceding communist era 
having an overbearing influence over party politics. 116 In all these cases strongmen like 
Milosevic, were veterans of communist rule and their lengthy periods of leadership had 
enabled them to create entrenched personalist bases of power. President Leonid Kuchma in 
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Ukraine, President Edward Shevardnadze in Georgia and President Askar Akayev in 
Kyrgyzstan all exhibited strong tendencies of personalistic leadership.117 In Ukraine, Georgia 
and Kyrgyzstan, political parties supporting dictators were even more fragile and fluid 
compared to Serbia, which at least had a solid ruling party – the SPS- in terms of grass-roots 
institutionalization and funding at the advent of multi-party elections.118 For instance, the 
Party of Regions was created by Ukraine’s Victor Yanukovych – President Kuchma’s protégé- 
just before he decided to contest presidential elections in 2004. In all the cases just like 
Serbia, the opposition was strong enough to pose a formidable challenge to the regime in 
case of rigged elections yet the need to.119 Yet due to concentration of power in the hands 
of autocratic leaders, the latter took the risk of electoral cheating to either prolong their 
rule or hand over power to loyalists to ensure safe exit from politics. The popular protests 
which followed suit and dislodged these highly unpopular regimes often had disastrous 
outcomes for the former incumbent autocratic parties. For instance, the Party of Regions 
along with other parties which had supported Yanukovych were widely discredited after the 
elections and Yanukovych’s party had to suffer from legal battles for its involvement in 
electoral fraud at the hand of the new government.120 
The recent spectacular people’s power movements in North Africa and the Middle East have 
also demonstrated how personalist rulers leading authoritarian coalitions take the risky 
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decision of not loosening their grip of power in spite of intense popular pressure to step 
down. These empirical cases defy the dominant trend in current literature of comparative 
politics, which highlights the importance of strong institutions - political parties and 
legislatures - in maintaining durability of autocratic regimes in Middle East and North 
Africa.121 Yet the toppling of these ostensibly stable dictatorships has demonstrated how 
lack of power-sharing in some of these institutions abruptly and in fact completely 
eviscerated them in the face of popular pressure. 
When thousands of Egyptians protested in Liberation Square in the Egyptian capital of Cairo, 
Mubarak’s refusal to step down from power clearly showed that he was leading the game 
rather than the ruling National Democratic Party which had been in power for over thirty 
years. As the momentum of the protests rose sharply and Mubarak refused to accept his 
fate the NDP tattered rather abruptly due to loss of legitimacy and massive elite defections. 
Thus future research on political science needs to focus more closely on the internal 
dynamics of authoritarian institutions – such an intra-party power-sharing- to test major 
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